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There is no doubt that persistent vacancies in the membership of the federal ju-
diciary are, and are perceived to be, an important issue among federal judges.1
Under Judicial Conference policy, a court with a vacant judgeship for eighteen
months or longer is in a state of "judicial emergency."2 In 1992, more than sixty-
one percent of the federal judges responding to a Federal Judicial Center survey
rated delay in filling judicial vacancies as a "grave" or a "large" problem -no other
problem received as much stated concern. 3 And Chief Justice Rehnquist recently
noted:4
The President and the Senate should be commended for confirming 28 new Article
III judges during the First Session. That action still leaves 113 vacancies on the Ar-
ticle III bench -representing more than 13 percent of all authorized judgeships.
Sixty-four of these vacancies have been left unfilled for over 18 months, some as
long as four years. There is perhaps no issue more important to the judiciary right
now than this serious judicial vacancy problem. Were it not for the dedication of our
hard working senior judges, the courts would be addressing an even more serious
* This Article is derived from a research paper that the authors prepared for the Committee on Long Range
Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable com-
ments and assistance received from various members of the Committee and agency colleagues. Nevertheless, the
ideas expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Judicial
Conference, the Long Range Planning Committee, the Federal Judicial Center, or the Administrative Office.
** Dr. Bermant is the Director of the Planning and Technology Division of the Federal Judicial Center.
* Mr. Hennemuth is a senior attorney in the Long Range Planning Office of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
**** Dr. Mangum is an economist in the Planning and Technology Division of the Federal Judicial Center.
1. The discussion in this Article of judicial vacancies and appointments is limited to judgeships whose in-
cumbents serve during "good Behaviour" and with undiminished compensation under Article III, Section 1 of the
United States Constitution. Apart from Justices of the Supreme Court, this refers to circuit judges on the 13
United States courts of appeals, district judges on the 91 United States district courts, and the judges of the Court
of International Trade.
2. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 31-32 (Mar. 15,
1988). At the time of this writing, 49 vacancies exist that create "judicial emergencies" in 35 courts. Judicial
Boxscore As of August 1, 1994, ThE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Washington,
D.C.), Aug. 1994, at 6. In addition, because of persistent vacancies and increasing workload, two courts of ap-
peals have declared "emergencies" to enable panels to hear cases with less than two active judges from those
courts. See Chief Judge's Order Declaring an Emergency under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 1994);
Chief Judge's Order Declaring an Emergency under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 1991).
3. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE: RESULTS OF A 1992 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
SURVEY OF UNITED STATES JUDGES 3, 25, 47, 69, 91 (1994).
4. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1993 Year-end Report Highlights Cost-saving Measures, THE THIRD
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1993, 1, at 3-4.
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backlog today. I hope that in the coming year the executive and legislative branches
will take the necessary steps to fill these vacancies.5
To aid and encourage efforts to solve the vacancy problem, we provide an over-
view of its causes and possible solutions. First, the background of the problem is
presented briefly in historical, legal, and political contexts. Next, there is a statis-
tical breakdown showing the number and length of vacancies over the past two
decades, the effect of vacancies on the judiciary's workload capacity, and the ex-
tent to which vacancies are prolonged through delay in the nomination and confir-
mation stages of the appointment process. Finally, we identify and analyze a
variety of methods for reducing the length of vacancies or mitigating their impact
on the operation of the federal courts.
II. BACKGROUND
The starting point for examination of this problem is the constitutionally pre-
scribed mechanism for appointing judges of the federal courts. The Appointments
Clause of the U.S. Constitution reads as follows:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
[S]upreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
ments,
Although the next clause of that section empowers the President to fill vacancies
unilaterally during Senate recesses,7 the requirements of the Appointments Clause
must be met to make other than temporary appointments to the offices it covers.'
The rationale for requiring senatorial advice and consent for the appointment of
the nation's most important officers was provided by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist:
[T]he necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general a
silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the
President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters
from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a
view to popularity. And, in addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of sta-
bility in the administration. 9
5. Id. Despite the increasing assumption of federal court workload by senior circuit and district judges, their
contributions have not been able, in recent years, to offset the loss of functional capacity in the courts caused by
judicial vacancies. See Henry J. Reske, Keeping Pace with Judicial Vacancies, 80 A.B.A. J. 34 (July 1994).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
7. "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,
by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. See
infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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The role of the Senate injudicial selection has been an active one from the "ear-
liest days" of the nation, because the senators have a substantial stake, for several
reasons, in affecting, and appearing to affect, the appointing process. 10 The advice
and consent language of the Constitution cannot convey the reality of complex po-
litical accommodation that must operate between the executive and legislative
branches during the early stages of the appointing process if it is to work effi-
ciently. When Lawrence Walsh was Deputy Attorney General in the Eisenhower
administration, he observed that "it is virtually impossible to have a person con-
firmed for a federal judgeship if one of the Senators from his state is either openly
or secretly opposed to the nomination.""1 Moreover, there is a very long tradition
of senatorial involvement in selecting judicial nominees, especially at the district
court level. When one or both senators from a state are of the same political party
as the President, the latter typically will nominate a candidate for district judge put
forward by the senator(s). 12
Concern about the numbers, causes, and consequences of judicial vacancies is
not a recent development. Examples of delay and recommendations for change
have been reported from time to time during at least the last four presidential ad-
ministrations. 13
In sum, the appointment of judges is in its essence a political process. When
there is tension between the President and one or more influential senators, and in
particular if a senator from the Judiciary Committee is in tension with the
President's likely candidate, both sides of the disagreement are likely to behave
tactically in order to gain advantage and prevail on the point of who will, or will
not, be nominated and confirmed. It has been very well documented that both
sides have used intentional delay as a tactical device.14
The intentional use of delay as a tool of practical politics will not be easily mod-
ified by an initiative for delay reduction coming from within the judiciary. The
reason is that neither the executive nor the legislature would be very likely to
relinquish control of a powerful tool voluntarily, unless the political benefits of do-
ing so made the trade-off worthwhile. What the beneficial trade-off would be is
not immediately clear, and there is a risk that an attempt by the judiciary to gain
10. HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972).
11. Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary-Progress and the Road Ahead, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y
155 (1960), quoted in CHASE, supra note 10, at 9.
12. See CHASE, supra note 10, at 35-47.
13. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON FED. CTs., Remedying the Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judici-
ary- The Problem of Judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REc. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 374 (1987); Victor Wil-
liams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185 (1993); Judith Havemann, Federal Vacancies
Becoming Drags on Policymaking; Top-Level Administration Appointees Outnumbered by Holdovers and Empty
Chairs, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1989, atA10; Bill McAllister, Byrd Undercuts Harrison Selection ofJudges, WASH.
POST, May 12, 1977, at B3; Leslie M. Werner, Needless Delays in Selecting Judges Snarl Federal Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1985, at A15.
14. Harold Chase devotes his book, see supra note 10, to close analysis of the process in the Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy, and Johnson administrations. He notes that delay by the President has been used to gain concessions from a
senator with particular interest in a nomination. CHASE, supra note 10, at 14, 40. Delay by the Senate is espe-
cially likely as presidential election time approaches and there is a reasonable chance that the party in the White
House will change.
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control of the appointment process could have a negative effect on relations with
the other branches.
Not all delays in the nomination and confirmation processes are intentional in
the political sense just described. It may be that recommendations coming from
the judiciary to the other branches that address delay in judicial appointments aris-
ing from administrative sources (any source that is not freighted by partisan politi-
cal considerations) would be more acceptable to the other branches. Some of the
suggestions reviewed below are of that sort.
Tension between the executive and legislative branches, with attendant delay,
seems inevitable so long as the appointing process proceeds with a requirement for
senatorial consent. There appear to be two routes leading out of that requirement.
One requires constitutional interpretation, the other constitutional amendment.
The question for interpretation is whether judges are among the "other [or 'prin-
cipal'] officers of the United States" who must be appointed by the President with
Senate confirmation, or are instead "inferior officers" as contemplated in the Ap-
pointments Clause.15 If the latter, then at least in principle Congress could vest ap-
pointment power in, among other places, "the President alone" or "the Courts of
Law."16 Our discussion of this question in part IV does not attempt to advance the
analysis of who may or may not be an "inferior" or "principal" officer for purposes
of appointment. It does, however, note the more recent case law and commentary
that address the point. As explained in text and notes below, the better view of the
applicable legal precedent, and certainly of custom, does not favor the treatment of
judges as "inferior" officers.
If judges cannot be appointed as "inferior" officers, then removing either the
President or the Senate from the appointing process would require constitutional
amendment. 17 Certainly, no proposal to allow temporary (other than "recess") ap-
pointments to the bench can be implemented without changing the Constitution.
Although such amendments may provide a ready solution to the vacancy problem,
pursuing that course of action could have other, less desirable consequences.
Efforts to modify the provisions of Article II or Article III to remedy delays in
15. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. Professor Peter G. Fish opened his treatise on federal court administration
with the assertion that "the Constitution defined judges of the inferior courts as 'superior' officers subject to Sen-
ate approval." PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 3 (1973). He could provide
no law on the point, for there is none that is dispositive, though Justice Story opined as much in his commentaries
of 1833. See infra note 77. During the 1930s, Professor Burke Shartel of Michigan Law School argued that judges
of the lower federal courts could be characterized as inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes, and that
Congress could accordingly vest the appointment of such judges in the Chief Justice acting either alone or with
the approval of a court. Burke Shartel, FederalJudges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibili-
ties under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485,528-29 (1930).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
17. The chief judge of the Second Circuit recently suggested that the "political branches" consider amending
the Constitution to authorize judges to fill vacancies in their ranks whenever the President fails to nominate a new
judge within one year after a vacancy arises. Honorable Jon 0. Newman, Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial
Conference (June 17, 1994) (transcript obtained from the circuit executive); see also Al Kamen, Judicial Vacan-
cies Spur Amendment Call, WASH. POST, June 20, 1994, at A13; Deborah Pines, Newman Proposes Allowing
Judges to Fill Old Vacancies, N.Y. L.J., June 17, 1994, at 1; Gail Appleson, Judge Says Courts, Not Congress,
Should Fill Posts, REUTERS, June 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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judicial appointments, in addition to being difficult to achieve politically, could
also serve to focus congressional and public attention on essential features of the
federal judicial office-tenure during good behavior and protection against dimi-
nution of compensation -that may not always enjoy broad and vigorous support
elsewhere in the government or among the public.
III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES
FROM 1970 TO 1992
This part presents a statistical analysis of the growth in judicial vacancies over
the past two decades. The analysis shows that over this period vacancy rates al-
most doubled in the courts of appeals and more than doubled in the district courts.
In addition, the largest proportion of delay in judicial appointments occurs during
the period between creation of a vacancy and a nomination to fill the judgeship -
the stage of the process largely (though not exclusively) controlled by the executive
branch.
18
A. Courts of Appeals
Figures 1 and 2 provide information on judicial vacancies in the regional U.S.
courts of appeals for statistical years [hereinafter SY] 1970 through 1992." As
shown in Figure 1, the number of authorized judgeships in the courts of appeals
increased from ninety-seven in SY 1970 to 167 in SY 1992.20 During the same
period, however, the number of sitting circuit judges increased from a low of
eighty-eight in SY 1971 to a high of 151 in SY 1991.21 This difference between
judgeships that were authorized and those that were filled is reflected in the judi-
cial vacancy rate shown in Figure 2. Over the entire period from SY 1970 to SY
1992, vacancies in the courts of appeals averaged 7 % and varied from a low of 1 %
in SY 1976 to a high of 21% in SY 1979. As can be seen from Figure 2, these
vacancies followed a generally cyclical pattern over the period, with peaks occur-
ring after judgeship bills were enacted in 1978, 1984, and 1990,22 and troughs oc-
curring in between. Figure 2 also provides information on the general trend in
circuit vacancies over this period.23 The overall increase in this trend was 80%
18. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
19. For purposes of this Article, "statistical year" denotes a 12-month reporting period ending June 30 of the
indicated year. In 1992, the federal judiciary shifted to a statistical reporting year that ends September 30. RE-
PORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (Mar. 16, 1992).
20. These statistics do not include the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or either of its
predecessors, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims.
21. Throughout this part, the number of"sitting judges" or "filled judgeships" in a given year is derived by
taking the number of circuit or, as the case may be, district judgeships then authorized by law and subtracting the
annual number of vacant circuit or district judgeship months divided by 12.
22. Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 202, 104 Stat. 5089, 5098 (11 circuit judgeships);
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 201,98 Stat. 333, 346 (24
circuit judgeships); Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3, 92 Stat. 1629, 1632 (35 circuit judgeships).
23. In this case (and those following), trend lines are computed using Ordinary Least Squares [hereinafter
OLS] regression analysis. The equation employed is Y = a + b(T), where Y, is the value of the series being esti-
mated (e.g., the judicial vacancy rate) for a particular time period, and Tis the time period (e.g., 1970 is period
one, 1971 is period two, etc.).
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from SY 1970 (a 5 % vacancy rate) to SY 1992 (a 9% vacancy rate). The increase
is not statistically significant, however."
Figure 1













Data Source: Federal Court Management Statistics, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 1970-1992 editions
24. Although this trend line (and others hereinafter described) represent the best possible estimates of average
change over time, they are presented for heuristic purposes only, and thus no strong inferences should be drawn
from them. The functions depicted by these trends are not always statistically significant due to the limited num-
ber of observations involved and the generally high degree of variance in those observations. In the instant exam-
ple, the F-statistic for the trend line is 1.19. Because this falls below the critical value for the F-statistic at the













Data Source: Federal Court Management Statistics, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 1970-1992 editions
B. District Courts
In Figures 3 and 4, information is presented on judicial vacancies in the U.S.
district courts for the period from SY 1970 to SY 1992. The number of authorized
judgeships in the district courts increased from 401 in SY 1970 to 649 in SY 1992.
As shown in Figure 3, however, the number of sitting judges increased from a low
of 352 in SY 1971 to a high of 567 in SY 1991. Figure 4 provides information on
the average judicial vacancy rate that was generated by this difference between
judgeships that were authorized and those that were filled. Over the entire period
from SY 1970 to SY 1992, vacancies in the district courts averaged 8 %, and var-
ied from a low of 3% in SY 1973 to a high of 17% in SY 1992. As can be seen
from Figure 4, these vacancies also followed a cyclical pattern over the period
with peaks occurring after each of the judgeship bills enacted in 1978, 1984, and
1990,25 and troughs occurring in between. Figure 4 also provides information on
the general trend in district vacancies over this period. The overall increase in this
trend was 120% from SY 1970 (a 5% vacancy rate) to SY 1992 (an II % vacancy
rate). Once again, this increase is not statistically significant. 8
25. Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 203, 104 Stat. 5089, 5099 (74 district judge-
ships); Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 202, 98 Stat. 333,
347 (59 district judgeships); Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, §§ 1-2, 92 Stat. 1629 (117 districtjudge-
ships).
26. The F-statistic for this trend line is 3.52. Because this falls below the critical value for the F-statistic at the
95% confidence level (4.32), the increase depicted by the trend is not statistically significant.
1994l
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Figure 3




Data Source: Federal Court Management Statistics,
United States Courts, 1970-1992 editions
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Figure 5 provides information on the general trend in filings per circuit judge
over the period encompassing SY 1970 through SY 1992.27 Two trend lines are
displayed. One depicts the general trend in appellate filings per sitting circuit
judge. This measure reflects the average workload faced by circuit judges over the
period based on the number of authorized judgeships that were actually filled. The
other line depicts the general trend in appellate filings per authorized circuitjudge-
ship. This measure reflects the average workload that would have been faced by
circuit judges over the period if all authorized judgeships had been filled (i.e., a
0% vacancy rate).2 Both trends are statistically significant." Comparing the fil-
ings per circuit judge from each trend line for SY 1992 reveals that workload in the
courts of appeals would have been reduced by 9 % (from 295 to 269 filings per
circuit judge) had the courts of appeals been at full judicial staffing levels.
In Figure 6, similar statistics are presented for the district courts.3" In this fig-
ure, one line depicts the general trend in total civil and criminal filings per district
judge given the number of authorized judgeships that were actually filled, and the
other line depicts the general trend in total civil and criminal filings per district
judge that would have occurred had all authorized judgeships been filled. Once
again, both trends are statistically significant.31 In this instance, a comparison of
filings per district judge from each trend line for SY 1992 reveals that workload in
the district courts would have been reduced by 10% (from 566 to 509 filings per
district judge) had the district courts been at full judicial staffing levels.
27. These trends are computed using raw, unweighted, appellate filings for SY 1970 through SY 1992.
28. We recognize, of course, that a 0% vacancy rate is a practical impossibility. The point of using it is to
establish a uniform baseline against which to measure the losses in work capacity caused by various judicial va-
cancy rates.
29. The F-statistic for the trend in appeals filed per sitting circuit judge is 530.73. Because this falls above the
critical value for the F-statistic at the 95% confidence level (4.32), the increase depicted by the trend is statisti-
cally significant. The F-statistic for the trend in appeals filed per authorized circuit judgeship is 187.09. Because
this falls above the critical value for the F-statistic at the 95% confidence level (4.32), the increase depicted by
the trend is statistically significant.
30. These trends are computed using the total of all raw, unweighted, civil and criminal filings for SY 1970
through SY 1992.
31. The F-statistic for the trend in civil and criminal filings per sitting district judge is 27.02. Because this
falls above the critical value for the F-statistic at the 95 % confidence level (4.32), the increase depicted by the
trend is statistically significant. The F-statistic for the trend in civil and criminal filings per authorized district
judgeship is 16.04. Because this falls above the critical value for the F-statistic at the 95% confidence level
(4.32), the increase depicted by the trend is statistically significant.
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Figure 5
Appeals Filed per Circuit Judge: SY 1970-1992
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Total Civil and Criminal Filings per
District Judge: SY 1970-1992
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D. The Appointment Process
One obvious explanation for the general increase in judgeship vacancy rates in
both the courts of appeals and district courts has to do with the time required to fill
vacant judgeships. For any given rate of attrition, the longer it takes to fill vacant
judgeships, the greater the overall vacancy rate will be. Figures 7 through 10 pro-
vide information on the length of time required to fill judicial vacancies in the
courts of appeals and district courts during the period from 1979 to 1992.32
Figure 7 presents information on the total time taken to fill judicial vacancies in
the courts of appeals during the years 1979 to 1992. For the period as a whole, the
average time required to fill judicial vacancies was 418 days. The averages for in-
dividual years ranged from a low of 258 days in 1982 to a high of 797 days in 1989.
In addition, an analysis of the trend line shows a 62 % increase in the average time
required to fill judicial vacancies from 1979 (319 days) to 1992 (517 days).33 This
increase is not, however, statistically significant.34
Figure 8 presents similar information for the district courts. There, the average
time required to fill judicial vacancies, during the period as a whole, was 412
days. The averages for individual years ranged from a low of 194 days in 1984 to a
high of 715 days in 1989. In this case, the trend line reveals a 48 % increase in the
average time required to fill judicial vacancies from 1979 (332 days) to 1992 (492
days)." Once again, however, this increase is not statistically significant.3"
Figure 9 breaks down the total time to fill judicial vacancies in the courts of ap-
peal during the 1979-1992 period according to the proportions accounted for by
(1) the time between vacancy and nomination -the stage primarily controlled by
the executive branch; and (2) the time between nomination and confirmation -
when the Senate is in control. During that period, the average time from vacancy
to nomination was 344 days, and the average time from nomination to confirma-
tion was seventy-five days. Based on these statistics, approximately 82 % of the
total time required to fill appellate vacancies during those years is attributable to
the process by which nominees were selected, with the remaining 18 % attribut-
able to the Senate's review of nominations that had been made. The overall trends
show a 52 % increase in average time from vacancy to nomination between 1979
32. These statistics are derived from data compiled on a calendar-year (not statistical-year) basis, and are
computed as the average number of days from vacancy to confirmation for all judges confirmed in a given year.
33. Although there may be concern that frequent judgeship bills during the 1979-1992 period have induced a
false upward bias in this trend, there are two reasons to believe otherwise. First, the largest increase in new
judgeship vacancies occurred after the 1978 judgeship bill, which was at the beginning -not the middle or end-
of the 14-year period. Second, because the time required to fill judicial vacancies is measured backward from the
date of confirmation, the yearly averages include vacancies created over a period of years rather than in a single
year.
34. The F-statistic for this trend line is 4.13. Because this falls below the critical value for the F-statistic at the
95 % confidence level (4.75), the increase depicted by the trend is not statistically significant.
35. See supra note 33.
36. The F-statistic for this trend line is 2.63. Because this falls below the critical value for the F-statistic at the
95% confidence level (4.75), the increase depicted by the trend is not statistically significant.
1994]
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(272 days) and 1992 (415 days), and a 115 % increase in average time from nomi-
nation to confirmation between 1979 (47 days) and 1992 (102 days). The increase
in time required for confirmation is statistically significant 7 while the increase in
average time required to nominate a circuit judge is not.38
Figure 10 presents similar information for the district courts. During the 1979-
1992 period, the average time from vacancy to nomination was 341 days, and the
average time from nomination to confirmation was 71 days. This indicates that ap-
proximately 83 % of the total time required to fill district court vacancies involved
nominee selection, with the remaining 17 % involving confirmation proceedings.
Here, the overall trends show a 35% increase in average time from vacancy to
nomination between 1979 (291 days) and 1992 (392 days), and a 143 % increase
in average time from nomination to confirmation between 1979 (41 days) and
1992 (100 days). For district judge appointments, however, neither the increase in
average time for nominations39 nor the increase in average time for confirma-
tions4 ' is statistically significant.
Figure 7
Total Average Days to Fill Judicial Vacancies in the
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37. The F-statistic for this trend line is 5.01. Because this falls above the critical value for the F-statistic at the
95% confidence level (4.75), the increase depicted by the trend is statistically significant.
38. The F-statistic for this trend line is 2.01. Because this falls below the critical value for the F-statistic at the
95% confidence level (4.75), the increase depicted by the trend is not statistically significant.
39. The F-statistic for this trend line is 1.01. Because this falls below the critical value for the F-statistic at the
95% confidence level (4.75), the increase depicted by the trend is not statistically significant.
40. The F-statistic for this trend line is 3.92. Because this falls below the critical value for the F-statistic at the
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Figure 9
Average Time from Vacancy to Nomination and Nomination
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Figure 10
Average Time from Vacancy to Nomination and Nomination
to Confirmation for District Judges: SY 1979-1992
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E. Summary of Statistical Findings
1. Courts of Appeals
* The average judicial vacancy rate from SY 1970 to SY 1992 was 7%.
* There was an 80% increase in the trend injudicial vacancies over the SY 1970-
1992 period.
* Had the courts of appeals been fully staffed with active judges in SY 1992, fil-
ings per circuit judge would have been reduced 9 % nationally.
* An average of 418 days was required to fill a judicial vacancy in the courts of
appeals during the period from 1979 to 1992.41
* Time from vacancy to nomination - the part of the appointment process largely
under executive branch control - accounted for approximately 82 % of the total
time required to fill a judicial vacancy in the courts of appeals during the 1979-
1992 period.
* Time from nomination to confirmation -the part of the appointment process
controlled by the Senate -accounted for approximately 18% of the total time
required to fill a judicial vacancy in the courts of appeals during the period
from 1979 to 1992.
41. By comparison, during the period from 1981 to 1991, the average length of vacancies in senior positions
at eight executive branch agencies ranged from six months (approximately 180 days) to 20 months (approximately
600 days). GAO, POLITICAL APPOINTEES: TURNOVER RATES IN EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE POSITIONS REQUIRING SEN-




* The average judicial vacancy rate from SY 1970 to SY 1992 was 8%.
" There was a 120% increase in the trend in judicial vacancies over the SY 1970-
1992 period.
* Had the district courts been fully staffed with active judges in SY 1992, filings
per district judge would have been reduced 10 % nationally.
" An average of 412 days was required to fill a judicial vacancy in the district
courts during the period from 1979 to 1992.
" Time from vacancy to nomination-the part of the appointment process largely
under executive branch control - accounted for approximately 83 % of the total
time required to fill a judicial vacancy in the district courts during the 1979-
1992 period.
* Time from nomination to confirmation -the part of the appointment process
controlled by the Senate -accounted for approximately 17 % of the total time
required to fill a judicial vacancy in the district courts during the period from
1979 to 1992.
IV. SOLVING THE VACANCY PROBLEM: ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBILITIES
Possible solutions to the judicial vacancy problem fall into two main categories:
first, measures to expedite the filling of vacant judgeships; and second, measures
to offset the impact of vacancies on the workload capacity of the affected courts.
Since the details of implementation could be worked out in numerous ways, the
possibilities can only be described in general terms. The objective of this exercise
is to posit a range of potential solutions for further consideration. Although we ex-
amine the strengths and weaknesses of these ideas separately, some measures
might be employed more productively in combination with others or in variations
not specifically mentioned. Preferred solutions are no doubt those that can be im-
plemented through informal practice or, at most, regulatory or statutory change.
A. Measures to Expedite the Filling of Vacant Judgeships
Appointments to the federal bench can be expedited either by adopting policies
and procedures to speed the traditional appointment process or by using alterna-
tive methods of appointing judges on a permanent or temporary basis. We con-
sider these approaches separately.
1. Traditional Appointment Process
a. Ensure additional time for selection of judicial nominees through advance
notice of judicial retirements - for example:
(1) judges provide notice at a prescribed time (e.g., six months to one year)
before taking senior status or retiring from office on other than disability
grounds; or
(2) the custodian of judicial personnel records provides notice whenever a
judge comes within a prescribed time (e.g., six months to one year) before
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attaining eligibility for senior status or retirement from office on other than
disability grounds.
Advantages
The lengthiest delays in filling judgeships arise in the process of identifying and
evaluating the suitability of potential nominees. If that process can be routinely
commenced before a vacancy arises, the period of time in which a court is required
to operate with a reduced complement of active judges could be shortened sub-
stantially. Although some departures from the bench or activejudicial service can-
not be anticipated (i.e., those resulting from death or sudden illness, disability, or
other change in personal circumstances), decisions to retire to senior status or
completely from the bench - the most common reasons for a judicial vacancy - are
frequently made well in advance of the effective date.42 Advance notice can be
used to expedite the selection of a replacement judge in two ways: (1) directly ap-
prising executive and legislative branch officials of the impending need for a judi-
cial appointment; and (2) affording bar and civic organizations an opportunity to
encourage and assist the President and the Senate toward prompt action on ap-
pointing a new judge.43
Disadvantages
Since vacancies occasionally arise from unforeseen events, advance notice of
"planned" retirements would not entirely eliminate the problem. Even where va-
cancies can be anticipated, it may not always be possible to select a successor be-
fore the vacancy occurs. In the first place, advance notice depends on voluntary
cooperation from individuals who, for various reasons, may not wish to make
their retirement plans known in advance. Unless Congress imposes such notice as
a prerequisite to retirement (an impractical step, given the sometimes sudden nat-
ure of retirement decisions), the only alternative would be to require the Adminis-
trative Office or court personnel officers to identify prospective vacancies based
on eligibility for retirement. The difficulty with that approach is the pressure it
might place on judges to retire as soon as they are eligible- a result contrary to the
voluntary nature ofjudicial retirement. In addition, it is unlikely that any advance
42. Ajustice or judge of the United States is eligible to retire either completely from the judicial office or from
regular active service (commonly known as "senior status"- involving retention of the judicial office with poten-
tial for further service) if he or she is at least 65 years old, has completed at least 10 years of service as such
justice or judge, and the total of age and length of service equals 80 or more years. 28 U.S.C. § 371(a)-(c) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992). Whenever ajustice or judge retires from office or to senior status, the President is authorized
to appoint a successor "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. § 371 (d).
43. Six years ago the Judicial Conference "[u]rged all judges nearing retirement to notify the President and the
Administrative Office as far in advance as possible of a change in status- if possible, six to twelve months before
the contemplated date of change in status." REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 31-32 (Mar. 15, 1988). While many retiring judges have been providing this kind of advance
notice, compliance is by no means universal, a fact perhaps attributable to the intensely personal nature of these
decisions. Another factor is lack of knowledge regarding the Conference policy: Although it is publicized for-
mally at irregular intervals, see Senior Judge Notification Sought, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the
United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1994, at 2, judges who are not presently considering retirement
may not attend to such advisories.
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notice of a possible, but not clearly-anticipated retirement would prompt selection
of a new judge until the incumbent provides actual notice of his or her intent to
retire.
b. Establish a more formalized process for the selection of judicial nominees
by:
(1) expanding presidential and/or senatorial reliance on commissions, com-
mittees, or staffs to maintain current lists of available, qualified candidates
for federal judgeships; and
(2) ensuring that adequate financial and other resources are devoted to in-
vestigation and evaluation of the character and qualifications of potential
judges.
Advantages
At present, nominees for federal judgeships are selected through a variety of
methods which depend on the type and geographic location of the positions to be
filled, the decision-making styles of persons involved in the process, and the pre-
vailing political realities. Although new judges occasionally are selected in a
coherent, well-organized manner (e.g., reliance on established screening proce-
dures, nominating commissions, etc.)," nominations to judicial office are too of-
ten the product of an unsystematic, indeed idiosyncratic, process to which
insufficient staff or other resources are applied.4" The impact of inefficient vetting
is compounded if delays are occasioned in other elements of the selection process
(e.g., FBI background investigations or American Bar Association [hereinafter
ABA] qualification ratings)."s Speedier, perhaps surer decisions would be possi-
ble -thus reducing the length of judicial vacancies -if more uniform, regularized
44. The most widespread use of judicial selection panels occurred during the Carter Administration. See,
e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,059, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1979) (establishing U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission);
Exec. Order No. 12,097, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1979) (encouraging establishment of senatorial panels to screen poten-
tial district judge nominees); Exec. Order No. 11,992, 3 C.F.R. 124 (1978) (establishing Committee on Selec-
tion of Federal Judicial Officers); see generally LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES
CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); ALAN NEFF, THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES
(1981). Although those panels were abolished soon after Ronald Reagan became President, see Exec. Order No.
12,305, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 14 app. at 1182 (1988), some senators continue to utilize
their own nominating panels in making recommendations on district judgeships. See W. Gary Fowler, Judicial
Selection under Reagan and Carter: A Comparison of their Initial Recommendation Procedures, 67 JUDICATURE
265, 269-73 (1984); William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1,41 (1990).
45. For a detailed description of the process traditionally employed in selecting and reviewing judicial nomi-
nees, see, e.g., ABA, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY-WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS (1983);
CHASE, supra note 10. Sources of information on the judicial selection process in recent administrations include:
CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE-THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY
61-66(1992); Sheldon Goldman, Bush s Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282 (1993); Elliot E.
Slotnick, Federal Judicial Recruitment and Selection Research: A Review Essay, 71 JUDICATURE 317 (1988); and
R. Townsend Davis, Jr., Note, The American Bar Association and Judicial Nominees: Advice Without Consent?,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 550 (1989).
46. See, e.g., Jon Jeter, Judgeship Nomination on Hold, Williams Must Wait As Senate Considers Civil Rights
Choice, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1994, at M 1; Al Kamen, Vow on Federal Judges Still on Hold, WASH. POST, Oct. 29,
1993, at A25.
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methods for identifying, screening, and evaluating candidates for federal judicial
office were adopted, and if greater financial and personnel resources were de-
voted to all stages of the judicial selection process."
Disadvantages
While increased efficiency in nominee selection can help, in some cases, to
shorten the time required to fill judicial vacancies,' adequate procedures and
availability of resources are only part of the problem. Politics (in all of its per-
sonal, partisan, and institutional contexts) is a key element in judicial appoint-
ments that cannot be avoided through a more formalized vetting process. Barring
the unlikely prospect of a "merit" selection system in which political leaders play
no meaningful role, clashes between powerful individuals or interests will con-
tinue to play a role in delaying the appointment of federal judges.49
c. Establish norms under which
(1) the President nominates a new judge within a prescribed time after a va-
cancy arises; and
(2) the Senate acts on a judicial nomination within a prescribed time after it
is received from the President.
Advantages
The establishment of fixed time periods for nominating and confirming judges
would be salutary even where not legally binding. If generally recognized by na-
tional political leaders, the organized bar, and the news media, time limits would
emphasize the importance of judicial appointments and foster public expectation
that vacancies in the courts will be filled expeditiously. Specific "benchmarks" or
"guidelines" could encourage executive and legislative branch personnel and oth-
ers associated with the process (e.g., the ABA) to organize their work so that the
various tasks involved in selection and review of judicial nominees would be com-
pleted promptly.
47. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 13, at 193 (recommending that "President Clinton and all future presi-
dents. . . maintain an active waiting list of their approved judicial candidates" so that nominations can be made
as soon as vacancies arise).
. 48. One problem with advance, pre-vacancy selection ofjudicial nominees is the timing of background inves-
tigations. Although it might be necessary to repeat such investigations if they are conducted too early, the value of
maintaining "waiting" lists of potential judges could be diminished if no advance inquiries are made into possible
conflicts of interest or other disqualifying factors.
49. Some commentators suggest that the Senate participates in judicial appointments to a degree beyond the
framers' intent, and that the President should assert a "preemptive" role in selecting judges on a national basis,
without reference to senatorial courtesy and state-based politics. See CHASE, supra note 10, at 204-05; Williams,
supra note 13, at 192-93; Victor Williams, Senators Cannot Be Choosers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 17. Not
surprisingly, a current member of the Senate advocates the contrary view -that earlier consultation with the Sen-
ate on potential Supreme Court (and presumably lower court) nominees is appropriate. See Paul Simon, The Ex-
ercise of Advice and Consent, 76 JUDICATURE 189 (1993). Although debate on this point will undoubtedly
continue, a marked shift in the balance of appointing power, toward either the executive branch or the Senate, is




Informal guidelines aimed at timely judicial appointments are valuable only in-
sofar as the relevant parties continue to observe them. Nevertheless, it may be a
useless exercise to accord them legal force (i.e., by legislation, Senate rule, or ad-
ministrative regulation). Unless deadlines for presidential or senatorial action can
be enforced through litigation (an unlikely prospect, given the requirements of
standing and justiciability that must be satisfied) or serve as a "trigger" for alterna-
tive appointment authority,"0 any time frame for filling vacancies might be ignored
without adverse consequences.51
2. Alternative Methods of Appointment
a. Utilize the recess appointment power to avoid prolongation of judicial vacan-
cies caused by delays in Senate action.
Advantages
As indicated above, 2 during periods when the Senate is not in session, the
Constitution explicitly vests the President with authority to fill vacancies in offices
to which appointment otherwise requires the Senate's "advice and consent."53
These "recess" appointees are entitled to serve until a presidential nominee (typi-
cally the same individual) is confirmed, or until the end of the next session,
whichever occurs first. ' Although no judicial vacancy has been filled in this man-
ner since 1980,"s ample precedent for such appointments can be found in the-first
50. See discussion infra part IV.A.2.
51. The inefficacy of statutory time limits for official appointments is illustrated in the recent history of the
Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation-a panel authorized under the Ethics Reform Act of
1989 to review and adjust periodically the salaries paid to senior federal officials. See Pub. L. No. 101-194,
§701, 103 Stat. 1716, 1763-67 (codified at2 U.S.C. §§351-364(1988&Supp. IV 1992)). Although the terms
of the first set of commission members fbr the 1993 fiscal year were to "begin not later than February 14, 1993,"
2 U.S.C. § 352(8)(A), only three of 11 commission appointments were made, and even those occurred months
after the statutory deadline. See, e.g., 139 CoNG. REc. S13,230 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1993). Ultimately, the issue
became moot when Congress denied all funding for the Commission in the 1994 fiscal year. See Treasury, Postal
Service, and General Government Appmpriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-123, 107 Stat. 1226, 1239 (1993).
52. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
53. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. Historically there has been disagreement as to whether recess appointments can
be made to all offices that happen to be vacant during a Senate recess (i.e., regardless of when the vacancy arose),
or merely to those that become vacant while the Senate is recessed. EDwARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 189 (Harold W. Chase & Craig R. Ducat eds., 14th ed. 1978). Though Congress has
never fully embraced the more expansive view, see Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III
Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1758, 1786 & n. 156
(1984), these appointments have been used frequently to fill offices that fell vacant before the recess began. In
two instances, appointments to such pre-existing vacancies have been upheld at the appellate level. See United
States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986);
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709-14 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963).
54. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
55. White House Weighing Recess Appointments to Fill Federal Judgeships Before January, WASH. INSIDER
(BNA), Dec. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAWI File. The last judicial recess appointee was
Judge Walter Heen who served on the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii from December 31, 1980,
through December 16, 1981. Wood/ey, 751 F.2d at 1009.
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188 years of American history. 6 Recess appointees provide a readily available
means of maintaining the courts' working capacity at full (or at least greater)
strength when vacancies are prolonged through tardiness in nominations or delays
in Senate action based on political disputes or other difficulties.57
Disadvantages
The utility of recess appointments for filling judicial vacancies is clouded by
political and legal concerns. If that power were used again in this context, ques-
tions would be raised about the appointee's decisional independence prior to con-
firmation," as well as the Senate's ability to review meaningfully the nomination
of that individual for a permanent appointment.59 Thus, a return to frequent use of
recess appointments ofjudges is likely to engender opposition in Congress and the
56. Recess appointments to the federal bench began in 1789, when President Washington appointed three dis-
trict judges between sessions of the First Congress, and have included such 20th century examples as Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren; Associate Justice William Brennan; Circuit Judge (and later Associate Justice) Thurgood
Marshall; and Circuit Judges Augustus Hand, Harrison Winter, and Griffin Bell. In all, 309 judges have served
under recess appointments. See Appellee's Second Supplemental Brief, United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328
(9th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-1028) (containing a complete list of all recess appointments to Article III courts from
1789 through 1980), vacated, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1010-11;
Williams, supra note 13, at 193; Curtis, supra note 53, at 1785; Virginia L. Richards, Note, Temporary Appoint-
ments to the Federal Judiciary: Article H Judges?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 702, 703-04 (1985).
57. See Williams, supra note 13, at 193 (depicting judicial recess appointments as "necessary for the adjudi-
cation of the war on crime, the protection of the rights of criminal defendants and all civil litigants, and the future
welfare of America's businesses").
58. Because recess commissions are of limited duration, see supra note 7, judges who are recess appointees do
not enjoy lifetime tenure and effective protection against salary diminution. Although the Supreme Court has
never addressed the constitutionality of recess appointments in the judicial context, the issue has been litigated
twice in recent decades, resulting in two appellate decisions that affirm the validity of such appointments despite
the tension between the Recess Appointments Clause and the guarantees of Article III, Section 1. See Woodley,
751 F.2d at 1009-14; United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964
(1963).
Serious questions, however, remain about the impact on decisional independence of a judicial recess appoint-
ee's limited tenure and, in many cases, desire for a permanent appointment. While some commentators challenge
the Second and Ninth Circuits' constitutional interpretation (and in particular, their reliance on historical practice
to resolve the tension between Articles II and III; see Richards, supra note 55; Paul F. Solomon, Comment, An-
swering the Unasked Question: Can Recess Appointees Constitutionally Exercise the Judicial Power of the United
States?, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 631 (1985)), others emphasize the practical concerns raised when a judge exercises
judicial power with "one eye over his shoulder on Congress." HARv. L. SCH. REc., Oct. 8, 1953, at 1, col. 5,
cited in Woodey, 751 F2d at 1014 (Norris, J., dissenting); see also Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices:
Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1162 (1988) (The assertion that recess appointments of
judges are unconstitutional "may be an unduly strict construction of the President's constitutional authority, but
the argument calls into question the propriety of such appointments.").




legal community.6" In addition, doubts as to what constitutes a "recess" might eas-
ily convince a President that the only prudent course (i.e., one that avoids the dis-
ruption that a legal challenge to a judicial appointment would bring) is to exercise
this power only during the brief intervals between annual legislative sessions."
Even those limited opportunities would be further diminished by the restrictions
Congress has traditionally placed on salary payments to recess appointees.62
Beyond legal and political constraints, greater use of recess appointments
would be of little practical value in ameliorating the judicial vacancy problem. Al-
though the amount of time required for Senate review of judicial nominations has
increased substantially in the past two decades (i.e., at more than three times the
rate of increase in time required for nominee selection),63 the period of time fol-
lowing nomination constitutes, on average, less than one-fifth of the average time
needed to fill a judicial vacancy.64 Since recess appointees typically are individuals
who have already been selected for nomination, exercise of the power is unlikely
60. Throughout most of our constitutional history, recess appointments have been used to fill judicial vacan-
cies without stirring philosophical or political debate. See Curtis, supra note 53, at 1775-77, 1785-86. Indeed,
opposition did not manifest itself until Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy unleashed a relative flood of recess
appointments to the bench (53 in all) during their administrations. See Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1015-16 (Norris, J.,
dissenting); see also CHASE, supra note 10, at 15-16; CORWIN, supra note 53, at 189; Louis FISHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION As POLITICAL PROCESS 141-43 (1988); Note, Recess Appointments to the Su-
preme Court-Constitutional But Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. REV. i24 (1957). Although congressional opponents
generally accepted the President's constitutional authority in this matter (at least by fbrce of history), see 106
CONG. REC. 18,130 (1960) (remarks of Sen. Philip Hart), this increasing use of judicial recess appointments
came under criticism because of its tendency to undercut Senate scrutiny of nominees- especially with regard to
the Supreme Court.
Ultimately, this perception that recess appointments were used too frequently produced a 1960 "sense of the
Senate" resolution that recess appointments to the Supreme Court "may not be wholly consistent with the best
interests" of the Court, the nominee, the litigants, or the people, and thus "should not be made except under unu-
sual circumstances and for the purpose of preventing or ending a demonstrable breakdown in the administration
of the Court's business." 106 CONG. REc. 18,145 (1960). Tellingly, no Supreme Court vacancies have been filled
by recess appointment since that time, and only one such appointment has been made to any federal court since
1964. See supra note 55.
61. Although the President has undisputed authority to make recess appointments during "sine die" adjourn-
ments (i.e., between the annual sessions of Congress), there has been disagreement between the executive and
legislative branches for decades over whether a "recess" may occur for appointment purposes when the Senate
interrupts its meetings within a congressional session, particularly when the interruption is less than 30 days in
duration. See Bill McAllister, Recess Appointments: A Disputed Matter of Timing, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at
A13.
62. A recess appointee cannot be paid a salary prior to Senate confirmation if the vacancy in question existed
during the preceding Senate session unless (1) the vacancy arose during the last 30 days of the session; (2) a nomi-
nation (other than of an individual who was a recess appointee during the preceding recess) was pending at the
end of the session; or (3) a nomination (other than of the individual who is the present recess appointee) was
rejected during the last 30 days of the session, and unless the President submits a nomination to fill the vacancy
during the first 40 days of the next session. 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (1988). Prompted by successive presidents' broad
interpretation of this power, see supra note 53, this statute was first enacted during the Civil War period. See Act
of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. 25, § 2, 12 Stat. 642,646. At first, all recess appointees were required to remain unpaid until
the Senate confirmed their appointments, see, e.g., id., but eventually Congress authorized the above-mentioned
exceptions. Act of July 11, 1940, ch. 580, 54 Stat. 751; see Allocco, 305 F 2d at 714-15 ("The deterrent to abuse
of power. . . was found to be unnecessary and incongruous in an era when the President, without the advice and
consent of the Senate in many areas, may well have the power to control the destiny of all mankind.").
63. See supra part 1II.D.
64. See supra part III.D.
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to reduce appreciably the length of judicial vacancies." Indeed, it may only pro-
vide the Senate with impetus to delay final action on nominations to offices held
by recess appointees.
b. Authorize alternative methods for filling vacant judgeships if inordinate delays
arise due to inaction by the President and/or the Senate -for example:
(1) provide that the President can appoint judges without Senate confirma-
tion (or that judicial nominations are automatically deemed confirmed) if
the Senate fails to act on a nomination within a prescribed time after it is re-
ceived;
(2) permit the Senate to make judicial appointments whenever the President
fails to nominate a new judge (or make a recess appointment thereof) within
a prescribed time after a vacancy arises; or
(3) authorize a judicial branch authority (e.g., the Chief Justice, the Judi-
cial Conference, or a court) to fill a vacant judgeship by an interim or perma-
nent appointment if-
(A) the President fails to nominate a new judge (or make a recess ap-
pointment thereof) within a prescribed time after a vacancy arises;
(B) the Senate fails to act on a judicial nomination within a prescribed
time after it is received; or
(C) a court with a vacant judgeship demonstrates an urgent need to
have the vacancy filled; for example, if the court's annual vacancy rate
or average caseload for its active judges exceeds a prescribed level, or
if a "judicial emergency" exists because the judgeship in question has
been vacant beyond a prescribed time (i.e., the 18-month period es-
tablished by Judicial Conference policy).
Advantages
Establishing one or more "backup" appointment mechanisms would put "teeth"
in any statutory time limits that may be imposed on the President and/or the Sen-
ate. It not only could inspire adoption of more efficient procedures but also en-
courage resolution of political disputes that frequently postpone nominee selection
and confirmation proceedings. Although the executive and legislative branches
are unlikely to relinquish total control of judicial appointments to each other, even
less to the judiciary, both might find it more acceptable to permit interim
65. An alternative would be to fill vacant judgeships temporarily with individuals who would not be consid-
ered for permanent appointment. That approach may permit a less extensive screening process and prompt less
political opposition in Congress. Although few attorneys would be likely to relinquish their practices for a judi-
cial "career" of six to 12 months, Congress might see fit to authorize other federal judicial officers (e.g., magis-
trate judges, bankruptcy judges, and judges of Article I "legislative" courts) to accept temporary appointments to
the district or circuit bench while taking only a leave of absence from their regular positions.
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appointments by a neutral "third party" (i.e., the judicial branch),66 particularly if
the authority is reserved for longstanding vacancies or other exigent circum-
stances.67 Indeed, the prospect of ceding power to fill judgeships, even temporar-
ily, to a nonpartisan entity might indirectly ensure observance of the prescribed
time limits by the politicians who are principally responsible for judicial appoint-
ments. 68
Disadvantages
Political considerations. Traditionally, both presidents and senators have
viewed appointments ofjudges as key opportunities to influence the philosophical/
ideological development of the law and, not inconsequentially, to exercise political
patronage. 9 For that reason, any proposal that might deprive the executive branch
or legislative branch, or both, of this valuable tool would face a stiff, uphill battle.
Practical considerations. Although holdups sometimes occur at later stages of
the nomination and confirmation processes (particularly if political difficulties
arise), much of the delay in filling judicial vacancies can be attributed to the pre-
liminary screening, evaluation, and investigation of potential or actual nominees.
If failure to nominate or confirm by a predetermined date were to trigger a shift of
appointing authority to another branch, the inevitable pressure on the relevant
principals and staff might result in hasty, ill-considered decisions that are espe-
cially unfortunate when appointments conferring substantial authority and lifetime
tenure are involved. 70
Moreover, the benefits to be achieved are by no means certain. As noted in re-
gard to recess appointments, the elimination of Senate participation is unlikely to
66. An analogy to this approach can be found in the statute providing for appointments to the office of United
States Attorney. Under certain circumstances the district court is authorized to appoint a person to serve as U.S.
Attorney for the respective judicial district until a vacancy in that position is filled in the ordinary manner. See 28
U.S.C. § 546 (1988). Of course, the appointment of an executive officer in this manner does not raise the same
concerns about tenure, see infra note 72, and decisional independence, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Also, it is easier to characterize a U.S. Attorney as an "inferior officer" for purposes of the Appointments Clause.
See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
67. In a number of states the judiciary is authorized to fill court vacancies pending selection of more perma-
nent successors by the other two branches or the electorate. See LARRY BERKSON, ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN
THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1981); MARVIN COMISKY, ET AL., THE JUDICIARY- SELEc-
TION, COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 6-7 (1987).
68. Congress has provided a similar mechanism in the District of Columbia. Under that district's charter, Pub.
L. No. 93-198, tit. IV, 87 Stat. 774, 785 (1973), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-131,91 Stat. 1155 (1977), and
Pub. L. No. 99-573, 100 Stat. 3228 (1986), D.C. superior court and court of appeals judges are appointed by the
President subject to Senate confirmation, but the President's nominees must be selected from a list of candidates
submitted by ajudicial nominating commission. See D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 11 app. § 433(a) (1989). If the Presi-
dent fails to nominate one of the listed candidates within 60 days after receiving the list, the commission is autho-
rized to nominate and, with Senate approval, appoint one of those candidates to the judgeship. Id. § 434(d)(1).
69. See CHASE, supra note 10 passim; CLAYTON, supra note 45, at 61 & n.98; Larry W. Yackle, Choosing
Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REv. 273, 279-80 (1989).
70. The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal recently noted that a careful vetting ofjudi-
cial candidates to ensure "select[ion of] only the most highly qualified and honest judges" might significantly re-
duce if not eliminate the likelihood of later judicial misconduct. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 81 (1993). The Commission therefore recommended that "FBI full-field inves-
tigations ofjudicial candidates be as comprehensive as reasonably possible to ensure sound judgments about their
integrity and qualifications." Id. at 82.
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yield significant time savings. Nor would removing the President from the process
make any appreciable difference: Identifying and screening possible appointees
would require as much time and effort if either the Senate or a judicial branch en-
tity assumed direct responsibility for those tasks. Although matters could be
expedited if persons already in judicial office were appointed,71 another FBI back-
ground investigation would still be required (at least to update the information on
file) if the new appointment were more than temporary.
Constitutionality. Any legislation that reassigns the power to appoint federal
judges, even on an interim basis,72 faces the likelihood of constitutional challenge.
As indicated above, judges in the federal courts are "officers of the United States"
who must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause of the Consti-
tution.73 Although Congress may vest "in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments" the power to appoint "such inferior officers
as [Congress] think[s] proper," this does not allow Congress, either of its houses,
or any congressional officer to appoint non-legislative personnel.7" Therefore,
short of constitutional amendment, the Senate cannot be authorized to appoint
judges on its own initiative if the executive is dilatory in making nominations.
The constitutional issue does not end there. Despite the seeming breadth of
Congress's power to authorize "inferior officer" appointments, significant ques-
tions exist about whether such appointments can include judges appointed to serve
during good behavior." First, there is reason to conclude that the framers specifi-
cally intended for judges to be appointed only in the manner prescribed for "princi-
pal" officers (i.e., by the President with the "advice and consent" of the Senate).76
Second, it can be argued persuasively that officers of the rank, responsibility, and
71. See supra note 65.
72. The constitutional guarantees of good behavior tenure and undiminished compensation for judges obvi-
ously would preclude Congress from authorizing interim (i.e., limited-term) appointments to the bench. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. Although a recess appointment is also limited in duration, see supra notes 7, 58, it is ex-
pressly authorized in the Constitution itself. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) ("We must therefore view the recess appointee . . . as the extraordinary exception to the prescriptions of
article III."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986); see also COMMITTEE ON FED. CTS., supra note 13, at 378-79.
73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For purposes of the Appointments Clause, "officers of the United States"
include "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." Buckley v. Va-
leo, 424 U.S. 1,126 (1976).
74. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132-33.
75. Inasmuch as the Appointments Clause explicitly provides that "judges of the [Slupreme Court" are ap-
pointed by the President with Senate confirmation, Congress is powerless to enact an alternative method for ap-
pointing the Chief Justice and Associate Justices. Yackle, supra note 69, at 320, 323-24.
76. The reported proceedings in the Constitutional Convention suggest that all of the judicial offices contem-
plated in Article III were included in the ultimate compromise-i.e., presidential nomination with Senate confir-
mation-between total executive and total legislative control of appointments. Although later versions of what
became the Appointments Clause mention.only "judges of the [Slupreme Court," earlier proposals and drafts re-
fer to judicial appointments generically or else mandate legislative appointment of "inferior tribunals." See I THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119-21, 126-28, 224-26, 230-31 (Max Farrand ed., 3d ed.
1966); 2 id., at 37-39, 41-46, 71-83, 539-40, 599-600; JEFFREY ST. JOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL JOURNAL-A COR-
RESPONDENT'S REPORT FROM THE CONVENTION OF 1787, at 118, 199 (1987); see generally JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 19-24 (1953); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins
of the Appointnent Clause, 37 SYRtACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1061-70 (1987). But see Shartel, supra note 15, at 519-24
(concluding that the Convention's discussion ofjudicial appointments consistently distinguished between the Su-
preme Court and other federal courts).
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tenure of judges who serve on the courts of appeals, district courts, and Court of
International Trade are not "inferior officers" as contemplated in the
Appointments Clause." If either interpretation is correct, no alternative method
of filling judicial vacancies (recess appointments aside) could be adopted without
77. Admittedly, an opposite conclusion might be reached. As some commentators observe, the courts of ap-
peal, district courts, and Court of International Trade are "inferior" courts established by Congress under Article
111, Section I of the Constitution. See CHASE, supra note 10, at 5,205-06; CORWIN, supra note 53, at 187 n. 139;
Shartel, supra note 15, at 515. If "inferior" were defineable purely in a relational sense, see Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I] nferior Courts" are mentioned in the Constitution in ways
that "plainly connote [ I a relationship of subordination."); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 546 note, 551 note (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961), Congress might be justified in treating judges who sit on courts
below the Supreme Court level as "inferior" officers. See Shartel, supra note 15, at 499-519; Yackle, supra note
69, at 282, 323-24. But that interpretation finds no historical support: "[F]rom the early days of the Republic
'[t]he practical construction has uniformly been that [judges of the inferior courts] are not. . . inferior officers."
Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 768 n.7 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 456 n. 1 (1833)); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(a), 133(a) (Supp. IV 1992); FISH, supra
note 15, at 3. Cf In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476,481 (D.C. Cir.) ("Among the officers who must be appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate it seems most obvious to include the heads of depart-
ments and federal judges since they are specifically empowered (along with the President to whom they are linked
in the clause) to appoint inferior officers."), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988).
Indeed, basing "inferior officer" status on relative position in the government ignores whether an officer is sub-
ordinate or "inferior" to another in any way that is meaningful for purposes of the Appointments Clause. See An-
drew Owen, Note, Toward a New Functional Methodology in Appointments Clause Analysis, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 536, 553 (1992) (Such an approach "is overinclusive because every official in the federal bureaucracy can
be said to be subordinate to another in some sense."). A recent Supreme Court interpretation of the Clause sug-
gests that an "inferior officer" is not only "to some degree 'inferior' in rank and authority," but also "perform[s]
only certain, limited duties," holds an office "limited in jurisdiction," and enjoys "limited ...tenure."
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72. See id. (upholding court appointment of "independent counsels" under the Ethics
in Government Act). Although the "inferior" federal courts are subordinate to the Supreme Court in the adjudica-
tive hierarchy, it is difficult to reconcile the attributes of "inferior" status identified in Morrison with the broad
decisional independence and authority of circuit, district, and Court of International Trade judges. Cf Applica-
bility of Antilobbying Statute (18 U.S.C. § 1913)- Federal Judges, 2Op. Off. Legal Counsel 30, 32 (1978) (ob-
serving that "a federal judge ... lacks any direct superior"), quoted with approval in 63 Comp. Gen. 624 (1984).
By contrast, the longstanding authority of "Courts of Law" to appoint adjunct judicial officers and court staff is
entirely consistent with the Morrison criteria. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, Ill S. Ct. 2631,2640 (1991)
(special trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-53
(1931) (United States commissioners); In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257-58 (1839) (clerks of court);
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537,545 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (United
States magistrate judges), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
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constitutional revision if it would remove the Senate from the appointment proc-
ess 78 or transfer appointing authority to the judicial branch."
B. Measures to Offset the Impact of Judicial Vacancies
Ultimately, it may be more productive to address the effects of the vacancy
problem as well as treat its various causes. To a large degree, delays occur in filling
judgeships because of unavoidable political factors or unanticipated circumstances
peculiar to a nominee. Whatever the reason, the impact of prolonged vacancies is
the same: Courts are deprived of the requisite judge power to meet their workload
requirements. Although some or all of the above-described measures might be
used to expedite the appointment process, vacancies undoubtedly will continue to
occur more rapidly than the system can fill them. The courts will be adversely af-
fected unless they possess a reserve capacity to function well at less than full
strength. Of course, the judiciary has shown a remarkable ability to absorb va-
cancy-imposed burdens through sharing of resources,80 innovative procedures,
and hard work; and this is likely to continue.81 Nevertheless, the number and dura-
78. A different question might be presented if judicial nominations could be confirmed without formal
action, or if action of nominations became compulsory. Given the Senate's near-plenary authority to "determine
the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2, it seems plausible that it might adopt a rule (or consent
to legislation containing a provision) under which a nomination is either confirmed "automatically" or accorded
priority over all other business (thus requiring formal approval or rejection) if the Senate does not act disposi-
tively within a prescribed time after the nomination is received from the President.
79. At first glance one might question whether the Constitution's identification of "Courts of Law" in this con-
text precludes Congress from vesting appointing authority in individual judges or judicial branch entities that are
not denominated as "courts." If so, the implications go well beyond the present inquiry: In numerous instances,
the power to appoint judicial branch officials has been conferred on a court's chief judge or a non-adjudicative
body composed entirely of judges. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 152(a)(3), 154(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (chief
circuitjudge appoints bankruptcy judge or designates chief bankruptcy judge if a majority of the court of appeals
cannot agree on whom to appoint or designate); id. § 332(e) (circuit judicial council appoints the circuit execu-
tive); id. § 601 (Chief Justice appoints the Director and Deputy Director of the Administrative Office); id.
§ 621 (a)(2) (Judicial Conference elects members of the Federal Judicial Center Board); id. § 624(l) (Federal Ju-
dicial Center Board appoints the Director and Deputy Director of the Center); id. § 631(a) (chief district judge
appoints magistrate judge if a majority of the court cannot agree on whom to appoint); see also Shartel, supra note
14, at 494-99 ("Whatever might be the proper reading of the appointment clause, as an original matter, the prac-
tical construction of it by Congress and the judiciary branch establishes conclusively the proposition that appoint-
ment by a single member of a court is appointment by a court of law.").
Beyond the weight of historical precedent, a narrow construction seems contrary to the apparent intent of the
"inferior officers" provision. By their use of the phrase "Courts of Law" in contrast to "the President alone" and
"the Heads of Departments," the framers appear to refer collectively to the courts as an institution. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) ("Congress may allow [inferior officers] to be appointed by... the Judiciary.").
Without directly confronting the issue, the Supreme Court implicitly accepted this broader view in a decision
upholding -on the basis of the "Courts of Law" provision-the authority of the chief judge of the United States
Tax Court to appoint "special trial judges" for that court. See Freytag, Ill S. Ct. at 2644-46.
80. Existing law provides mechanisms for temporary reassignment of judges to assist other courts whenever
the press of business requires additional judge power. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-294 (1988).
81. For example, workload demands exacerbated by vacancies might be met by assigning a greater proportion
of district court business to magistrate judges or bankruptcy judges, or through increased use of special masters to
conduct certain proceedings. Beyond a possible need for statutory or rule changes, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)-(c)
(1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b), the primary difficulty with that approach would be the limited tenure and com-
pensation of these adjudicators-factors that, under existing law, preclude the exercise of full Article III jurisdic-
tion by individuals lacking life tenure and salaries guaranteed against diminution. See, e.g., Peretz v. United
States, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); CFTC v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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tion of vacant judgeships are showing an upward trend that will strain the system
beyond endurance unless something is done to alleviate the problem and its effects.
1. Adjust the workload formulas or other standards for creation of new judge-
ships to account for the chronic reduction in available resources caused by pro-
longed vacancies.
Advantages
Allocating judgeships to courts in sufficient number to offset anticipated va-
cancy rates would seem to be a straightforward, yet flexible response to the prob-
lem.82 One approach would be to determine all judgeship needs through a
workload formula that takes into account the average number and duration of
vacancies nationwide.83 Alternatively, the vacancy rates of individual courts
might be factored into their respective requests for new judgeships (e.g., by in-
creasing the number of requested positions by the same percentage). These details
could be established informally, and thus revised from time to time or varied in
specific cases without legislative action.' Although building in a vacancy "cush-
ion" based on national statistics could result in judge power disparities among
courts, it should be feasible for the judiciary and Congress to monitor the effects of
the policy and eliminate unnecessary positions through attrition as new vacancies
occur. In the meantime, any underutilized resources would be available to the sys-
tem at large for temporary assignment to courts where workload burdens exceed
the capacity of locally available judges.85
Disadvantages
The critical issue in evaluating this option is whether the benefit outweighs the
cost. For example, would the creation of extra judgeships help the judiciary by en-
suring the availability of resources, or would it simply exacerbate the problem by
82. In its 1987 report on possible solutions to the judicial vacancy problem, a committee of the New York City
Bar Association recommended the creation of additional judgeships based on anticipated vacancies as the only
'practical means to bring the federal judiciary close to its authorized limits, and thereby speed the administration
of justice." COMMITTEE ON FED. CTs., supra note 13, at 382.
83. The Judicial Conference makes requests to Congress for new circuit and district judgeships based in large
part on predetermined ratios between workload and judges. For example, in the Conference's biennial surveys of
judgeship needs between 1980 and 1992, the benchmark for considering a new district judge position was an
average, five-year time-weighted caseload of more than 400 filings per authorized judgeship in a particular
court. For the courts of appeal, the threshold was reached in the 1986 through 1992 surveys when the average
number of "merits dispositions" (cases resolved on the substantive merits) for the five-year period exceeded 255
per authorized judgeship in a particular court. GAO, How THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ASSESSES THE NEED FOR
MORE JUDGEs 4-5 (Jan. 1993); HISTORY OF THE AUTHORIZATION OF FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS INCLUDING PROCEDURES
AND STANDARDS USED IN CONDUCTING JUDGESHIP SURVEYS 5-6, 8-13 (1991) (unpublished report prepared by the
Analysis and Reports Branch, Statistics Division, Adminsitrative Office of the U.S. Courts) (on file with the
Mississippi College Law Review). If the average national rate of vacancies (i.e., vacant judgeship months as a per-
centage of total authorized judgeship months) is "X" percent over a five-year period, the Conference could reduce
its judgeship workload benchmarks by the same percentage so that each court might have a built-in capacity to
carry on its business despite the impact of future vacancies.
84. Of course, the creation of new judgeships would still require congressional approval. The difference is
that the underlying methodology would not be written into law.
85. See supra note 80.
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adding to the number of vacancies that must be filled? The budgetary impact alone
might dissuade Congress from pursuing this remedy, at least while various means
of reducing delay in the appointment process itself remain unexplored. There is
also a risk to the judiciary that basing judgeship requests on so variable a factor
could undermine the credibility of its entire methodology for determining judicial
resource needs. Even if there was agreement in principle to consider anticipated
vacancies when authorizing judgeships, it might be difficult in practice to reach
consensus on how to account for them appropriately. In any event, this approach
might produce greater delays in filling vacancies if the executive and legislative
branches begin to perceive that prompt action is no longer necessary to meet judi-
cial workload demands.
Finally, one should keep in mind that the judiciary's requests for additional cir-
cuit and district judgeships are based primarily on ratios of judicial workload to
numbers of authorized judge positions. 6 While this approach may overestimate
the functional capacity of courts with vacant judgeships, it also tends to underesti-
mate the contributions of senior, visiting, and adjunct (e.g., magistrate) judges .87
If the practical effect ofjudicial vacancies is recognized in this manner, the judici-
ary might be forced, in an era of growing dockets but tight budgets, to forgo addi-
tional life-tenured judges in favor of other, possibly less certain, resources.
2. Create an appropriate number of "floater judgeships" (i.e., judgeships not per-
manently allocated to specific courts) whose incumbents are always available for
assignment to courts where workload capacity is diminished by vacancies.
Advantages
Since vacancies are a system-wide problem, it might be appropriate to mitigate
their effect on the judiciary as a whole by maintaining a fixed number of judge-
ships that are not tied to a particular court. 8 This would allow the judiciary to de-
ploy additional resources to courts with prolonged vacancies but avoid both the
risks of altering the judgeship formulas and the possibility of overstaffing individ-
ual courts whose vacancies have been filled.
Disadvantages
Theoretical concerns. Federal judges have nearly always been drawn from, and
identified with, the region or locality in which they serve. Use of "floater judge-
ships," even on a limited basis, would constitute a departure from tradition that
may not be politically or philosophically acceptable. The only previous experi-
86. See GAO, supra note 83, at 4-5.
87. In surveying district judgeship needs, the Judicial Conference considers information on the availability of
senior judges and magistrate judges. GAO, supra note 83, at 78. To date, however, the Conference has never
declined to recommend creation of an additional judgeship based on availability of magistrate judges, and senior
judge resources have affected the result only in borderline cases.
88. In September 1982, a Judicial Conference Committee on Judgeship Vacancies recommended further
study of the idea that "floater" judgeships be created in sufficient number to offset the average rate of vacancies




ment of that kind - the Commerce Court early in this century - was hardly an un-
qualified success."
Practical considerations. It might be difficult to find qualified individuals who
are willing to assume and remain in this kind of "roving" assignment.9" Also, a
judge not attached to a "home" court might pose administrative problems with re-
gard to support staff and chambers, as well as questions concerning reimburse-
ment of travel and living expenses.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
As the foregoing indicates, clear-cut solutions to the problem of judicial vacan-
cies may be elusive. In the first place, the more important determinants of change
rest with the executive and legislative branches. Although the judiciary might sug-
gest a number of options to those institutions, the reality is that outside recom-
mendations about internal organizational change are often not well received.
Moreover, an expedited appointment process for judges should not be achieved at
the expense of thoroughness in reviewing the character and abilities of potential
jurists. In the final analysis, a positive attitude and commitment from all three
branches - a sense of urgency whenever a vacancy arises - will speed the process
most reliably. For a number of years, the judiciary has felt the urgency on a daily
basis. It may be hoped that other national leaders are beginning to sense the im-
portance of the vacancy problem as well.91
89. During its brief existence (1910-1913), the Commerce Court comprised five circuit judges whom the
Chief Justice designated and assigned to serve on that court for five-year terms. Although the existing circuit
judges were eligible to sit on that court, the enabling legislation authorized the President to appoint "five addi-
tional circuit judges no two of whom shall be from the same judicial circuit who shall hold office during good
behavior and who shall be from time to time designated and assigned by the Chief Justice of the United States for
service in the circuit court for any district, or the circuit court of appeals for any circuit, or in the commerce
court."Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 201,36 Stat. 1147; Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539-40. When
the Commerce Court was abolished, the five extra judgeships remained in existence during the lives of the in-
cumbents. Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 92D
CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS AND THE JUDGES
WHO SERVED DURING THE PERIOD 1801 THROUGH MAY 1972, at 25-28 (Comm. Print 1972). Although the in-
cumbents continued to serve on various courts of appeal and district courts for approximately 20 years, the
"floater" judge idea apparently did not gain acceptance.
90. Rather than attempt to recruit new judges permanently for such positions, it might be more feasible to
authorize the Chief Justice to assign existing judges to "floater" service for limited periods. To do so, however,
would require Congress to allocate additional judgeships to one or more courts- in effect adopting the alternative
remedy previously analyzed.
91. According to recent public statements, the filling of vacant judgeships has become a top priority for both
the Clinton Administration and the Senate. See Delaware-area Lawmakers: Highlights oftheirAgendas, GANNETT
NEws SERVICE, Jan. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (quoting Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary); New Justice Official to Focus on Crime Bill,
Judges, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (quoting Deputy Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick); Attorney General Janet Reno, Remarks at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference 16-18
(Aug. 17, 1993) (transcript obtained from the Justice Department).
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